Metaphors of warfare and the lessons of history: time to revisit a carbon tax? by Naomi Oreskes
Climatic Change (2011) 104:223–230
DOI 10.1007/s10584-010-9887-5
Metaphors of warfare and the lessons of history:
time to revisit a carbon tax?
An editorial comment
Naomi Oreskes
Received: 22 April 2010 / Accepted: 12 May 2010 / Published online: 30 June 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Maurie Cohen (Cohen 2010) revisits the world of rationing in World War II and
suggests that the experience of rationing in the UK under the dire conditions of Nazi
bombardment and threatened invasion may provide useful lessons as to how a cap
and trade system to control and reduce carbon emissions might work in a world of
dire climate change. Cohen’s argument is triggered in part by the use of warfare
metaphors by leading politicians and journalists to command public attention over
the looming dangers of unmitigated climate change. To be sure, the scientific
evidence is overwhelming that if left unchecked, increased atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations and decreased global forestation will lead to significant changes
in the Earth’s climate, ecosystems, and ocean chemistry (Solomon et al. 2007; see
also Oreskes 2004). Among other things, we can expect major human dislocations
from sea level change and altered patterns of precipitation (Stern et al. 2006; Parry
et al. 2007). Such impending difficulties—and the relative inaction and complacency
of much of the world in the face of them—has caused some leaders to turn to the
metaphor of warfare to convey the urgency of the situation, and to suggest that the
need for a cap and trade system with strict limits on corporate and personal carbon
use has now reached the level of an emergency.
1 Is warfare the right metaphor?
Is warfare the right metaphor? Will it help? Will it work? Cohen argues that the
warfare metaphor is intended in part to overcome resistance: to convey a sense of
urgency that will cause citizens to awake from their complacent slumbers and accept
the need for action. But resistance has many causes, one of which is the widespread
human desire to avoid unpleasantness. It could be that the analogy of warfare—with
all its unpleasant associations—might trigger the very anxiety and resistance it is
intended to overcome.
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Former US Vice President Al Gore has popularized the notion of inconvenient
truths, but scientists have recognized for some time that both the general citizenry
and government leaders are often loath to accept scientific evidence whose conclu-
sions are awkward or unpleasant. In 1949, when the USSR detonated its first atomic
bomb, the USA had to face the grim reality that it had lost its monopoly on nuclear
weapons. Scientists had been warning since 1945 (and even before) that the notion
of a nuclear monopoly was misguided, that nature has no secrets and an intelligent
adversary would soon be able to build an atomic bomb, too. This warning was largely
ignored, until the events of 1949 proved it prescient. However, the success of their
predictions did not increase scientists’ standing. One the contrary, when scientists
now said that any attempt to one-up the Soviets by building the H-bomb would
simply accelerate the arms race, they were accused of being disloyal. As the chemist
Harold Urey, 1934 Nobel Laureate for his discovery and isolation of deuterium,
wrote: “We scientists not only failed to convince Congress and the public of the
soundness of our prediction that the Russians would have the bomb in about five
years after we had it, but, because we told disagreeable truths, we have even been
accused of wishing to give up our progress because we are impractical dreamers or
plain traitors.” (Urey 1949, quoted in York 1976, on p. 43).
What is most disagreeable to many “resistors” (as I shall call those who resist the
scientific evidence of anthropogenic global warming) is the fear of coercive govern-
ment: that the threat of severe climate change and unmanageable sea level rise
will be used as warrant for heavy-handed government intervention in national and
even global economic activity, and perhaps control of individual activities, as well
(Oreskes and Conway 2010). Indeed, there is an uncanny parallel with the events
of 1949: fear of the Soviet Union in 1949 was not about a potential Soviet invasion
of mainland America, which was clearly not within the realm of Soviet capability,
or even that they would bomb us into obliteration (although that anxiety would
come later). It was, rather, that the Soviets would export communism to Europe,
from which it would spread, perhaps, into the USA as well, and we would all
soon live under the communist yoke. Today, American conservatives and right-wing
commentators have re-awakened the beast of red-baiting, as when columnist Charles
Krauthammer recently alleged that environmentalism is socialism by other means:
“With socialism dead...the Left was adrift until it struck upon a brilliant gambit:
metamorphosis from red to green” (Krauthammer 2009). Or consider the recent
claim of Patrick Michaels, a longtime critic of climate science and some-time policy
scholar at the libertarian Cato Institute, who criticized plans for a cap and trade
system to control greenhouse gases as “Obamunism” (Michaels 2009).
Warfare is seen by both liberals and conservatives as legitimate basis for govern-
ment action that would otherwise be intolerable, so the warfare metaphor may
suggest the very coercion that resistors most fear. Therefore, it may not be the best
metaphor for finding and sustaining a political middle ground.
2 Is global warming an emergency?
It is hard to imagine anyone who would not argue that opened armed conflict con-
stitutes a national emergency and therefore justifies emergency measures. This,
of course, was precisely the justification for rationing during World War II, and,
Climatic Change (2011) 104:223–230 225
as Cohen notes, the vast majority of British citizens accepted its necessity (and
similarly, resisted its continuance after overt hostilities had ended). Fraud and black
marketeering occurred, to be sure, but they were remarkably rare: Cohen cites the
work of Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2000) who estimates black market transactions as
accounting for only 10% of total automobile use. That is a very low number; even
if the real figure was twice that, it means that the vast majority of citizens largely
respected the rationing system.
But is climate change an emergency? The Oxford English Dictionary defines the
term as a situation “urgently demanding immediate action.” It also notes the com-
mon association with warfare: “as a political term, to describe a condition approxi-
mating to that of war; . . . as a synonym or euphemism for war; also state of emergency,
wherein the normal constitution is suspended.”1
Why is action required immediately in an emergency? The dictionary does not
say, but most of us understand the implication that if immediate action is not taken,
serious harms will directly ensue. A fire is an emergency because if we don’t leave the
building we may burn or perish from smoke inhalation; a heart attack, a drowning,
or a man lost overboard at sea is an emergency, too. The implication is one of
impending death, or at least serious bodily harm; the further implication is that
immediate action—such as calling the fire department or throwing out a lifeline—
can be efficacious to prevent the harm. There is also an implication of certainty: there
is no doubt that a man lost at sea, if not quickly rescued, will surely drown. Finally
most of us view emergencies as involving people. If avian flu swept the USA, killing
tens of thousands, it would be viewed as an emergency, but if the same flu killed tens
of thousands of pet parakeets, it would probably be viewed as very sad, but not an
emergency.
At the risk of being quoted out of context, I would suggest that climate change
is not, in fact, an emergency, as conventionally understood. As Cohen correctly
notes, “atmospheric warming lacks the immediacy and tangibility of aerial bombard-
ment. . . .” Serious harms will eventually ensue if we fail to act, but the harms are
not, by and large, immediate. And because the harms will be unfolding over the next
several decades, or even centuries, even if we do act now, our actions will not show
immediate effects. Moreover, many of the expected harmful effects—such as ocean
acidification—are not well understood. They may precipitate a chain of undesirable
events whose adverse consequences eventually reach human populations, but how
that will happen and who among us will be affected remains uncertain. And many of
the harms will accrue to non-human species.
3 Cap and trade as a form of rationing
Cohen argues that a cap and trade system is essentially a form of rationing, and so the
lessons of history can help us to plan our cap and trade system. Among other things,
we should be prepared for fraud and black-marketeering, and to adjust regulations
to respond to changing circumstances. (He might also have added that we should be
1http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50073965?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=
emergency&first=1&max_to_show=10
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prepared for serious resistance, including riots.) We should also realize that citizens
will tolerate sacrifice only for a limited period of time, during which a clear end is
in sight.
Cohen’s conclusions are reasonable, but there is another possible reading of his
evidence. Rather than take the lessons of history to suggest how to plan and manage
our cap and trade systems, we might take them to suggest that cap and trade may not
be the right approach after all.
If climate change is not a war, and we are not in an emergency, then the lessons of
history suggest that citizens will not be willing to accept serious sacrifices to stop it.
The situation would have to become extremely dire—with the threat of imminent
death—before rationing would become acceptable, and by that time the changes
underway would almost certainly be impossible to stop (if they are not in fact too
late to stop already: Meehl et al. 2005; Wigley 2005; Solomon et al. 2007; Stainforth
et al. 2007; Ramanathan and Feng 2008; Hansen 2009).
Because climate change will now be with us for the foreseeable future, it is hard to
see it as a condition that will justify the suspension of “the normal constitution,” and
hard to see how people can be mobilized to accept emergency measures to address
it. Climate change will become the new normal. Therefore, whatever mechanism
is used to address it has to be normal, too. The most likely mechanism that fits
that bill is a carbon tax. Whatever you say about taxes, no one can deny that they
are normal.
4 Carbon tax as a normal mechanism to stop climate change
Carbon taxes have been under discussion for some time. Indeed, in the early 1980s,
economists working with the National Academy of Sciences Climate Research
Board, including Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, explicitly considered a carbon
tax as a mechanism for mitigating global warming. At that time, Schelling and his
colleagues rejected the idea on the grounds that the tax required to affect energy use
would be very large, politically unacceptable, and possibly economically destructive.
Given that the physical impacts of predicted warming were at that time highly un-
certain, and the likely social impacts even more uncertain, Schelling and his col-
leagues concluded that the best response at that time was to wait and see how matters
developed, and, if necessary, to adapt to changes as they unfolded (Schelling 1980).
At about that same time, cap and trade mechanisms were being considered as a
possible response to sulfur pollution implicated in acid precipitation, and for dealing
with air pollution in the Los Angeles basin (South Coast Air Quality Management
District 1994; Young 1996; Bryner 1997; Kamieniecki et al. 1999; Moore 2003). As
an alternative to command and control solutions to pollutions, cap and trade was
viewed as congenial by many political moderates and conservatives for addressing
global warming as well, because it drew on market concepts, promised consumers
(particularly industrial consumers) more flexibility than they might otherwise have
had, and appeared more politically palatable than a carbon tax.
However, as economists studied possible responses to global warming, many
came to the conclusion that, despite the political attractiveness of cap-and-trade, a
properly valued carbon tax might be a more efficient and effective mechanism to
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (And taxes, of course, are also a market-based
mechanism, insofar as they adjust the price of a good or service.) Yale economist
William Nordhaus (who ironically was a member of the 1983 NRC study team),
argued in several papers over nearly two decades that an appropriately set, revenue-
neutral carbon tax could be an effective means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and would likely be more efficient than an emissions stabilization and trading regime
(Nordhaus 1993a, b, 1997, 2005, 2006, 2007). Others have made similar arguments
(Repetto et al. 1992; Parry et al. 1999; Shackleton et al. 1993; Cooper 2007; Metcalf
and Weisbach 2009; see also Pearce 1991, for an early summary of the advantages and
disadvantages of carbon taxes versus alternatives; and Stavins 2009, and Krugman
2010 for more recent comparisons). Recently, Nordhaus has made this argument
even more emphatically. At a presentation at a major international conference in
Copenhagen prior to the 2009 COP 15 meeting, Nordhaus argued that a carbon
tax would be the most effective and efficient incentive to shift the world to a low
carbon economy. “Taxation is a proven instrument. Taxes may be unpopular, but
they work,” he concluded.2
However, while there appears to be sound scholarly justification for carbon taxes,
politically taxes are anathema to many Americans, and in the dominant neo-liberal
policy environment of the late 1980s and 1990s, policy solutions focused on cap-and-
trade as a more desirable mechanism (Schneider 2009; Oreskes and Conway 2010).
(It is thus ironic that conservatives in the United States are now objecting to cap-
and-trade as burdensome and bureaucratic, requiring large degrees of government
involvement in compliance and verification, when the very idea was developed as a
means to avoid burdensome government taxation.3)
To return to Nordhaus’s claim that taxation is a proven instrument, we might
reply, “proven for what?” Proven for raising revenues, to be sure, but proven for
protecting the environment? That is not so clear. On the other hand, our experiences
with cap-and-trade are not unambiguous, either. The US experience of controlling
acid precipitation is often held up as a model of successful environmental regulation
through market mechanisms, but the fact is that while acid precipitation was reduced
significantly, it is not clear that it was reduced enough. While diverse groups declared
victory, and moved on to other matters, the US and Canadian forests continued to
decline (Likens and Franklin 2009; see discussion in Oreskes and Conway 2010).
Available analyses and experience suggest that both cap-and-trade systems and
carbon taxes have the capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and slow global
climate change, and both face significant challenges (Stavins 2009; Krugman 2010).
Either system will require enforcement mechanisms, compliance verification, and
monitoring of effects. Taxes may be simple in principle, but one need only look at the
American tax code to see what can happen in practice. Emissions trading may har-
ness the power of the marketplace, but that does not ensure that our environmental
goals will be met.
Moreover, both systems entail profound uncertainties. Advocate of emissions
trading often argue that this mechanism is preferable, because in a taxation regime
2http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/12/carbon-tax-should-replace-kyoto-protocol
3See for example http://spectator.org/blog/2009/06/25/congress-should-stop-al-gores.
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you do not know how people will respond to the tax, and therefore have no guarantee
that you will achieve the desired level of control on atmospheric GHGs. This is true.
However, in an emissions trading system, you do not know how the environment will
respond. Even if we effectively control anthropogenic CO2 by setting strict emissions
limits, continued warming could melt the tundra and release substantial amounts of
natural methane. In either case, scientific monitoring will be required to determine
the actual content of GHGs in the atmosphere.
If history is any guide, the most likely outcome is that either system will prove too
weak, and will have to be tightened and strengthened over time. So one question to
consider is this: is it likely to prove easier to lower the caps in a cap and trade system
or to raise the tax in a taxation regime?
This question is hard to answer, since we have relatively little experience with
cap-and-trade systems. However, if we think of a carbon tax as a kind of sin tax—
equivalent to the taxes on alcohol and tobacco—we might note that, despite the
general American animadversion to taxes, it has actually proved relatively easy to
increase these taxes, indeed, to increase them a great deal. Once the public accepted
that smoking was truly dangerous, opposition to heavy taxation fell away rapidly, and
today tobacco taxes are exceedingly high and an enormous source of governmental
revenues. It may well be that once the public begins to accept that uncontrolled
climate change will indeed be dangerous, they may also accept that substantial “sin”
taxes on carbon make sense.
Finally, to return to Cohen’s arguments, we can see one crucial potential benefit of
a revenue-neutral carbon tax: Once implemented, it will become part of life like any
sales tax, VAT, or other tax imposed at the point of purchase. It does not require any
special appeal to patriotism, exigency, camaraderie or any other virtue. It does not
require altruism. No one pretends that tax, any more than death, is a good thing, but
most of us (with some exceptions), accept that taxes are necessary for civil society
to function. We accept that taxes are normal.4 We need not invoke metaphors of
warfare or questionable claims of emergency and crisis. We just have to acknowledge,
as we do with the other forms of taxation with which most of us routinely comply,
that it is necessary.
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